Flash Player-related vulnerabilities currently account for approximately 14% of all Web application vulnerabilities discovered by WhiteHat Security. This statistic is surprisingly high considering that HTTP Archive reports 47% of Web applications are currently using Flash technology.
Flash Media Player is an effective method for delivering stylish vector graphics across multiple platforms to enrich a Web user’s experience. When properly designed, Flash makes a website visit interactive and fun. Unfortunately, Flash can also introduce vulnerabilities to an otherwise safe application. Many Flash developers are primarily designers who may have some programming experience, but little – if any – knowledge about Web security.
Flash Player itself has many security restrictions and policies, but users often misunderstand them – or even purposely disabled them to get a particular feature to “work.” Among many Flash designers, there’s also a common misconception that the Flash framework will provide all the protection their applications need.
One of the most frequent comments I get about Flash vulnerabilities is, “Doesn’t my cross-domain policy file protect me from that problem?” Well, the cross-domain policy file does prevent cross-domain data loading for execution; but it is a unidirectional permission that the server hosting the data file grants. The permission does not come from the Flash file. Some people may find the cross-domain policy file to be “backwards” compared to what they expect, and in many attack scenarios the Flash file will first seek permission from the attacker’s domain before initiating the attack.
Flash Player has an in-depth security sandbox model based on the domain where the Flash file is embedded, and I will discuss the scenarios for when a sandbox policy applies and how that policy can be bridged or bypassed – but in a later blog post. In this post I’m going to focus on the simplest and most prevalent method used today on the Web to exploit Flash files – unsanitized FlashVars.
Typical banner ad with FlashVars to specify remote image and link:
<param name="movie" value="swf/banner.swf" />
<param name="img" value="image1.jpg" />
<param name="link" value="http://www.whitehatsec.com" />
<embed src="swf/banner.swf" flashvars="img=image1.jpg&link=http://www.whitehatsec.com" />
Attackers link to SWF:
FlashVars with HTML Support
Server Filter Bypass
With the exception of Internet Explorer, Flash Player will evaluate a query string behind a hash character in all browsers. When a URL query string is placed behind a hash character the browser will not forward the query string with the request for the Flash file, thus allowing an attacker to bypass any attempt at server filtering.
Internet Explorer Sandbox Bypass
A recent Flash 0-day that allowed an attacker to submit arbitrary HTTP headers to an application was the result of an unhandled 307 redirection from a domain controlled by an attacker. Flash Player has always had limitations handling HTTP responses if it receives anything other than a 200 OK. The problem stems from lack of insight into how a given HTTP request is handled by the Web browser. Firefox 4 contains a new API that hopes to remediate this issue by providing additional insight for browser plugins. If a Flash file utilizes an external configuration file an attacker can bypass any attempt to restrict data loading from a given domain if the domain also contains an open redirection. The Flash file will verify that the initial request is for a trusted domain, but will load the malicious configuration file residing on the attacker’s domain.
Proof of Concept
The following video demonstrates the common issue of Flash files targeting external XML configurations via FlashVars without properly validating the XML file that resides on a trusted domain. Camtasia Studio’s popular presentation software was used to produce the video, which shows the vulnerabilities present in Camtasia’s own ExpressShow SWF files. The developer of the files, Techsmith, has addressed this issue with a patch that must be manually applied (available via Techsmith Security Bulletin 5). The patch restricts generated Flash files to loading XML configurations that reside on the same domain as the Flash file.
Guya.net – Flash Bug in Internet Explorer Security Model
OWASP Flash Security Project
Jason Calvert @mystech7
Application Security Engineer
WhiteHat Security, Inc.