Earlier this summer, The Intercept published some details about the NSA’s XKEYSCORE program. Those details included some security issues around logging and authorization:
As hard as software developers may try, it’s nearly impossible to write bug-free source code. To compensate for this, developers often rely on multiple layers of security; if attackers can get through one layer, they may still be thwarted by other layers. XKEYSCORE appears to do a bad job of this.
When systems administrators log into XKEYSCORE servers to configure them, they appear to use a shared account, under the name “oper.” Adams notes, “That means that changes made by an administrator cannot be logged.” If one administrator does something malicious on an XKEYSCORE server using the “oper” user, it’s possible that the digital trail of what was done wouldn’t lead back to the administrator, since multiple operators use the account.
There appears to be another way an ill-intentioned systems administrator may be able to cover their tracks. Analysts wishing to query XKEYSCORE sign in via a web browser, and their searches are logged. This creates an audit trail, on which the system relies to ensure that users aren’t doing overly broad searches that would pull up U.S. citizens’ web traffic. Systems administrators, however, are able to run MySQL queries. The documents indicate that administrators have the ability to directly query the MySQL databases, where the collected data is stored, apparently bypassing the audit trail.
These are exactly the same kinds of problems that led to the Snowden leaks:
As a system administrator, Snowden was allowed to look at any file he wanted, and his actions were largely unaudited. “At certain levels, you are the audit,” said an intelligence official.
He was also able to access NSAnet, the agency’s intranet, without leaving any signature, said a person briefed on the postmortem of Snowden’s theft. He was essentially a “ghost user,” said the source, making it difficult to trace when he signed on or what files he accessed.
If he wanted, he would even have been able to pose as any other user with access to NSAnet, said the source.
The NSA obviously had the in-house expertise to design the system differently. Surely they know the importance of logging from their own experience hacking things and responding to breaches. How could this happen?
The most cynical explanation is that the point is not to log everything. Plausible deniability is a goal of intelligence agencies. Nobody can subpoena records that don’t exist. The simple fact of tracking an individual can be highly sensitive (e.g., foreign heads of state).
There’s also a simpler explanation: basic organizational problems. From the same NBC News article:
“It’s 2013 and the NSA is stuck in 2003 technology,” said an intelligence official.
Jason Healey, a former cyber-security official in the Bush Administration, said the Defense Department and the NSA have “frittered away years” trying to catch up to the security technology and practices used in private industry. “The DoD and especially NSA are known for awesome cyber security, but this seems somewhat misplaced,” said Healey, now a cyber expert at the Atlantic Council. “They are great at some sophisticated tasks but oddly bad at many of the simplest.”
In other words, lack of upgrades, “not invented here syndrome,” outsourcing with inadequate follow-up and accountability, and other familiar issues affect even the NSA. Very smart groups of people have these issues, even when they understand them intellectually.
Each individual department of the NSA probably faces challenges very similar to those of a lot of software companies: things need to be done yesterday, and done cheaper. New features are prioritized above technical debt. “It’s just an internal system, and we can trust our own people, anyway…”
Security has costs. Those costs include money, time, and convenience — making a system secure creates obstacles, so there’s always a temptation to ignore security “just this once,” “just for this purpose,” “just for now.” Security is a game in which the adversary tests your intelligence and creativity, yes; but most of all, the adversary tests your thoroughness and your discipline.